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Mounsey: Constitutional Law - Taxation - The Constitutionality of the Alas
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-The Constitutionality of the Alaska
Exemption of the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980. Ptasynskl v.
United States, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo. 1982).

In 1979 President Carter proposed the decontrol of
domestic crude oil and the imposition of a tax on the windfall,
or additional profits, expected to be reaped by oil companies as
a result of decontrol.1 While Congress considered what form
the tax should take,2 the Carter administration began phasing
out price controls on domestic crude oil. 3 One year later, Congress passed the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act 4 of 1980
(the Act).
The Act imposes a tax (WPT), 5 paid by the producer, 6 on
domestically produced crude oil. The profit subject to tax is the
@Copyright 1983 by the University of Wyoming.
1. President Carter's Energy Address to the Nation, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 609,
610 (Apr. 5, 1979). The Congressional Record is replete with adjectives such as "huge"
and "enormous" describig the additional revenues expected to go to the oil companies.
S. (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1979).
See, e.g., 125 CONG. Rfc. 18470
2. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. S. 16864 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979); 125 CoNG. REC. S. 18863
(daily ed. Dec. 17, 1979).
3. Price controls on domestic crude were first imposed when President Nixon exercised his
authority, under the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-210, 85 Stat. 743, to impose a freeze onl efommoditie. Although price controls on
other commaodities were lifted not long thereafter, price controls on crude oil continued

No. 12287, 46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1981).
4. I.R.C. SS 4986-4998 (Supp. V 1981).
rate of tax.
of the category, base price,
chart illustrates the interaction
5. The following
Rate and
of Tax
Base Price
Category
See S4987
See S4989
See S4991
No Tax.
Not Applicable.
t 0mO oned by
Governments or
charities.
2. Indian Oil.
3.
Alaskan
4. Certain
"Front1end"
oil, Oil.
meaning oil the proceeds of
which are used, subject
to complex restrictions,
to finance tertiary recovery projects.
Tier 3:
$16.55, with various
1. Newly discovered oil
adjustments
2. Heavy oil
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Stripper oil
$15.20, with various
1. 2:
adjustments
2. National Petroleum
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difference between the removal price and a statutorily ad-7
justed base price, with severance and inflation deductions.
Because Congress wanted both to raise revenue and to
stimulate domestic production,8 crude oil was separated into
categories, or tiers, and taxed at different rates.9 For instance,
"newly discovered oil," a tier three oil, is taxed at 30%,
whereas "stripper oil," a tier two oil, is taxed at 60%, if produced by a non-independent producer. 10 Congress also provided that certain oil would be completely exempt from the WPT,
including oil owned by charities, Indian oil, and oil in
designated areas of Alaska."
Certain royalty owners and independent oil producers
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the
Act.1 2 Specifically, they challenged the provision of the Act
that exempts certain Alaska oil as violative of the constitutional requirement that indirect taxes be uniform (the uniformity clause) throughout the United States.13 The United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming held that the
Alaska exemption was facially discriminatory, consequently
violative of the uniformity clause, and that the remedy was not
simply to severe the Alaska exemption, but to invalidate the
entire Act. 14 The United States Supreme Court has granted
the government's petition for writ of certiorari.
Tier 1:
1. All other oil

Independents: 50%
Approximately. the May
Others: 70%
1979 ceiling price for
"upper tier" oil under the
rice control system, or about
13 .
Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 551 (D. Wyo. 1982).
6. I.R.C. S 4986(b) (Supp. V 1981).
7. I.R.C. S 4988(a) (Supp. V 1981).
8. What the true "intent" of Congress was when passing the Act was bitterly disputed in
the trial briefs. See Brief for Defendant, Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D.
Wyo. 1982); Brief for Plaintiff, Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo.
1982).
9. See supra the chart in note 5.
10. Id.
11. I.R.C. S 4994(e)(Supp. V 1981):
Exempt Alaskan Oil.-For purposes of this chapter, the term "exempt Alaskan
oil" means any crude oil (other than Sadlerochit oil) which is produced(1) from a reservoir from which oil has been produced in commercial quantities through a well located north of the Arctic Circle, or
(2) from a well located on the northerly side of the divide of the AlaskaAleutian Range and at least 75 miles from the nearest point on the TransAlaska Pipeline System.
12. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo. 1982).
13. Id. at 552. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 1 provides: "The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises ... but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States." (emphasis added).
14. 550 F. Supp. at 553, 555.
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This Note is limited to a consideration of the uniformity
issue. Part I begins by analyzing the traditional interpretation
of the uniformity requirement, and moves toward a definition
of uniformity in light of the United States Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncements on the subject. Part II outlines
the bases for the District Court's finding that the Alaska exemption violated the uniformity clause. Finally, Part III considers the District Court's application of the uniformity requirement, and suggests that the court failed to evaluate the
Alaska exemption in light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the subject.
PART I.

A. Uniformity and the Geographic Requirement
Few references were made during the constitutional
debates as to the purpose of the uniformity clause. Instead, the
dominant concern of the founding fathers appears to have
been with the imposition of a direct tax1 6 and its effects upon
the states.16 Of those commentators who have addressed the
subject, perhaps the most concise statement as to the purpose
of the unifromity clause was made by Justice Story. Discussing
in his commentaries why direct taxes were to be apportioned
and why indirect taxes were to be uniform, he stated that
The answer to the latter [the uniformity requirement]
may be given in a few words. It was to cut off all undue
preferencesof one state over another,in the regulationof
subjects affecting their common interests.Unless duties,
imports and excises were uniform, the grossest and
most oppressive inequalities vitally affecting the pursuits and employment
of the people of different states
might exist. 17
Implicit in this statement is the notion that the potential abuse
of the uniformity clause was geographic:the preference of one
state over another.
15. See 3 ELLuOT's DEBATES 248 (2d ed. 1836) (remarks by James Madison) ("the subject of

direct taxation is perhaps one of the most important that can possibly engage our
attention.")

16. A direct tax is a tax imposed on property itself, such as a property tax. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 415 (5th ed. 1979). An indirect tax, on the other hand, is a tax upn some right or
privilege, such as an excise tax. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 695 (5th ed. 1979).
17. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTrrTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES S 957, at 57 (3d

ed. 1853).
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Traditionally, the courts have followed Justice Story's
guidelines. In Head Money Cases,'8 for instance, the Supreme
Court evaluated the constitutionality of an excise tax laid upon
shipowners transporting noncitizens to United States
seaports. The tax was challenged because it did not apply to
noncitizens arriving in the United States by railroad or other
inland modes of conveyance. In upholding the tax, the Court
determined that a "tax is uniform when it operates with the
same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is
found." 19 In Justice Story's terms, because the subject of the
tax included seaports and the tax applied to all ports alike, giving no preference to the ports of one state over the ports of
another, it operated uniformly.20
In Knowlton v. Moore,2 1 the Court reaffirmed Justice
Story's interpretation of the uniformity requirement. In
Knowlton, executors of a decedent's estate challenged the constitutionality of death duties imposed by the War Revenue Act
of 1898.22 The executors argued that the uniformity clause required an intrinsic uniformity, whereby taxes operated equally
on all individuals.2 3 In effect, the executors argued that objects
being taxed by duties, imports, and excises must be located in
uniform quantities and conditions throughout the United
States. Expressly rejecting such an interpretation, the Court
first noted that an intrinsic uniformity interpretation would be
a virtual impossibility, because obviously objects subject to
duty, import, and excise taxes are rarely located in every state,
not to mention in equal quantities or conditions, and then went
on to conclude that only geographic uniformity, as defined in
Head Money Cases, was mandated by the uniformity clause. 4
B. The Current Status of the Uniformity Requirement
The Head Money Cases definition of uniformity has, until
recently, been the test applied by courts in determining
whether tax laws satisfy the geographic requirement. In two
18. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
19. Id. at 594. Although the statement has been widely quoted, technically it is dictum: the
tax was ultimately upheld on the basis of the power of Congress to regulate commerce.
Id. at 595.
20. Id. at 595.
21. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
22. War Revenue Act of 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448.
23. 178 U.S. at 84.
24. Id. at 97.
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recent cases arising under the bankruptcy uniformity clause, 25
the Court determined that the bankruptcy laws require the
same geographic uniformity required of tax laws.2 6 As a result,
the Head Money Cases definition of uniformity has been
reexamined.
Regional Rail Reorganization Cases27 (3R Act Cases) involved a crisis precipitated when eight major northeast and
midwest railroads entered into reorganization proceedings
under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. 28 Responding to the
crisis, Congress supplemented section 77 with the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act 29 (Rail Act), which, as its name implies, applied only to railroads in reorganization proceedings in
an expressly-defined group of states.30 Upholding the Rail Act
in spite of its regional application, the Court concluded that the
"uniformity provision does not deny Congress power to take
into account differences that exist between different parts of
the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems." 3' 1
If this broad statement were taken literally, it would seem
to suggest that Congress could enact legislation that on its
face preferred one debtor over another, the only requirements
being that the debtor's problem be isolated and result from differences existing between different parts of the country.32 But
the Court did not go that far, as evidenced by Railway Labor
Executives Assn. v. Gibbons,33 the most recent case dealing
with the bankruptcy clause's uniformity requirement.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 1, 4: "The Congress shall have Power To establish... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptices throughout the United States."
26. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
27. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
28. 11 U.S.C. S 205 (1898), repealedby Pub. L. No. 95-598, SS 401(a), 402 (a), 98 Stat. 2682(S
101 of which enacted revised Title II).
29. 45 U.S.C. SS 701-797 (Supp. IV 1980).
30. 45 U.S.C. S 702(15) (1976):
"Region" means the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ma land, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana,
Michigan, and Illinois; and those portions of contiguous States in which are

located rail properties owned or operated by railroads doing business primarily
in the aforementioned jurisdictions (as determined by the Commission by
order).
31. 419 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 185 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas stated: "I fear that the 'hydraulic
pressure' generated by this case will have a serious impact on a historic area of the law,
jealously protected over the centuries by courts of equity in the interests of justice."
33. 50 U.S.L.W. 4258 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1982).
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In Railway Labor, the Rock Island Railroad Transition
and Employee Assistance Act 34 (RITA) was challenged

because on its face it applied to only one bankrupt railroad.
The Court held that RITA was neither a response to particular
problems of major railroad bankruptcies, nor a response to any
geographically isolated problem. Instead, it was a response to
a particular problem of one bankrupt railroad. Consequently, it
did not satisfy uniformity clause requirements.3,

At first glance, it would appear that the only real distinction between the Rail Act in 3R Act Cases and RITA in
Railway Labor is that the Rail Act applied to a group of
railroads in a certain region, whereas RITA applied to only one
railroad in a certain region. Thus, it would seem that Congress
could have insulated RITA from any uniformity clause
challenge merely by making it applicable to the region in which
the Rock Island Railroad operated, rather than singling out the
Rock Island Railroad by name. In SR Act Cases, Congress had
done just that, and there the Rail Act survived a uniformity
clause challenge. A closer examination of SR Act Cases reveals,
however, that the Rail Act in fact survived a uniformity clause
challenge for another, and quite narrow, reason.
The Rail Act in 3R Act Cases was unusual in that, by its
terms, it was operative for only 180 days. 36 Because no
reorganization proceeding outside the defined region was
pending either on the effective date of the Rail Act or 180 days
thereafter, the Court concluded that the Rail Act in fact
operated uniformly upon all bankrupt railroads and their
creditors.3 7 Thus, 3R Act Cases would seem to qualify the Head
Money Cases definition 38 of uniformity only slightly: a tax is
uniform when it operates with the same force and effect
wherever the subject is found during the time the tax is applied, and Congress can consider regional problems when
legislating in these areas.
Upon reexamination of the facts in Head Money Cases it
becomes clear that Justice Brennan's sweeping language in 3R
34.
35.
36.
37.

45 U.S.C. SS 1001-1018 (Supp. IV 1980).
50 U.S.L.W. at 4262.
45 U.S.C. S 717(b) (1976).
419 U.S. at 160.

38. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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Act Cases describing Congress' power to enact bankruptcy
legislation affecting geographically isolated problems does not
in fact add to the Head Money Cases definition of uniformity.
In Head Money Cases, the problem seen by Congress did not
exist in the interior of the United States. In light of this fact, it
was unnecessary to make the tax apply to all states, because all
states did not have seaports. To satisfy the uniformity requirement, it was only necessary that Congress apply the tax
uniformly to all states with ports, which it did.3 9 Thus, to the
extent that Congress has always taken into account geographically isolated problems when legislating in the bankruptcy and
tax areas, the second part of the test is tautological.
This test, as qualified, is also consistent with Railway
Labor. In Railway Labor, the duration of the effective period
of RITA was not limited to 180 days, as was the Rail Act. And
RITA, by its terms, applied to only one particular railroad,
although on RITA's effective date there were other railroads in
reorganization proceedings that could have benefited from the
legislation enacted for the Rock Island Railroad. 40 Consequently, the Court's holding in Railway Labor is consistent with the
Head Money Cases test for uniformity, as reinterpreted in 3R
Act Cases.
PART II
A. The Court's Analysis
The Wyoming District Court found the provision of the
Act exempting Alaskan crude oil facially discriminatory and
thus "a clear violation of the constitutional requirement of
uniformity." 41 Applying the Head Money Cases definition of
uniformity, the court concluded that the WPT did not operate
with the same force and effect wherever crude oi42 was found
because oil in other states was subject to the tax, whereas oil in
certain areas of Alaska was not. 48 The Court also noted that,
although legitimate exemptions from tax could 44exist, they
must still satisfy uniformity clause requirements.
39. Id.
40. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4262.
41. 550 F. Supp. at553.
42. The court found that "production and removal of domestic crude oil is the subject of the

tax." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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PART III

A. The Subject Requirement
The fact that the District Court applied the Head Money
Cases uniformity test, rather than the test as qualified in SR
Act Cases, did not necessarily render the uniformity issue cutand-dried. The Head Money Cases test requires, in substance,
that the subject being taxed be taxed equally wherever it is
located. Thus, to apply either the Head Money Cases test, or
the Head Money Cases test as qualified in SR Act Cases, a court
must first discern the subject of the tax.
The District Court, apparently relying on the wording of
the Act itself,45 concluded that the subject of the tax "was the
production and removal of domestic crude oil.... "46 But even
a cursory reading of the Act reveals that the subject of the
WPT cannot simply be crude oil; otherwise, Congress could
not have categorized crude oil into tiers, containing different
types of crude oil, and then varied the rate of tax from tier to
tier.4 7 To illustrate this point, reference can be made to the
facts in Head Money Cases. There, the subject of the tax, noncitizens entering the United States at seaports, did not exist
within the interior of the United States. Nonetheless, if the
subject of the tax had existed within the interior, and had Congress exempted the subject within the interior, the tax could
not have been held uniform. Analogously, if the subject of the
WPT were only the production and removal of domestic crude
oil, rather than the production and removal of different kinds,
or types, of crude oil, as defined within the various tiers, Congress could not have varied the tax from tier to tier.
The United States had a different view as to what consituted the subject of the tax. It argued that, because oil in
Alaska is produced under such severe climatic conditions, it
48
amounted to a completely different subject under the Act.
Thus, the United States reasoned that, inasmuch as legitimate
exemptions from tax can exist,49 and because Alaskan crude oil
45. I.R.C. S 4986(a) (Supp. V 1981): "An excise tax is hereby imposed on the windfall profit
from taxable crude oil removed from the premises during each taxable period" (emphasis

46.
47.
48.
49.

added).
550 F. Supp. at 553.
See supra note 5.
Brief for Defendant, supra note 8, at 31 n.6.
550 F. Supp. at 553.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/6

8

Mounsey: Constitutional Law - Taxation - The Constitutionality of the Alas
583
CASE NOTES

1983

amounted to a completely different subject under the Act, the
Alaska exemption therefore did not violate the uniformity
requirement.
The fallacy of this argument lies in its premise that
Alaskan oil subject to the exemption amounts to a different
subject under the Act. The Alaskan exemption does not define
exempt Alaskan oil in terms of climatic conditions under which
it is produced, but instead defines exempt Alaskan oil in terms
of the regions of Alaska in which it is produced.50 And since the
Alaska exemption applies to "any crude oil" 51 produced in
those defined regions, it becomes necessary to refer to the Act
to determine into which tier the oil subject to the Alaska exemption falls. Because no oil was being produced in the exempt
Alaska regions at the time the Act was passed, 52 any Alaskan
oil subject to the exemption must be, by definition under the
Act, categorized as "newly discovered oil," 5 3 which is a tier

three oil, and consequently taxed at 30%.
B. Uniformity Versus Discrimination
The District Court's decision can also be criticized for its
finding that the Alaska exemption is facially discriminatory.
The issue under the uniformity clause is not whether Congress
discriminated against oil producers in other states by granting
oil producers in certain regions of Alaska an exemption; the
issue is whether the Act's provisions create uniform tax laws. 4
The facts in Ptasynski illustrate the importance of addressing
the correct issue under the uniformity clause.
In Ptasynski, the United States, apparently relying on
reasoning from 8R Act Cases, argued that because no oil was
produced in the exempt Alaska regions during the period for
50. I.R.C. S 4994(e) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 11.
51. I.R.C. S 4994(e) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 11.
52. See Affidavit of Kye Trout, Jr., filed with the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment,
Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 551 (D. Wyo. 1982).

53. I.R.C. S 4991(eX2) (Supp. V 1981) incorporates the June 1979 energy regulations definition for "newly discovered oil": " 'Newly discovered crude oil' means domestic crude oil
which is: (1) Produced from a new lease in the Outer Continental Shelf; or (2) produced
(other than from the Outer Continental Shelf) from a property from which no crude oil
was produced in calendar year 1978." 10 C.F.R. S 212.79(b) (1979).
54. See Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 50 U.S.L.W. 4258, 4262 n.ll (U.S. Mar.
2, 1982): "The issue is not whether Congress has discriminated against the Rock Island
estate, but whether RITA's provisions are uniform bankruptcy laws. The uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause is not an Equal Protection Clause for bankrupts."

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 6

584

LAND & WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVIII

which Plaintiffs sought a refund, the exemption could not have
discriminated against oil producers in other states during that
period.5 5 That the Act on its face exempted Alaska by name
was apparently irrelevant: the Rail Act in SR Act Cases had exempted certain states by name, and it was held uniform.
This reasoning is flawed because it suggests that the
Court's decision in SR Act Cases was based on a finding that
the Rail Act did not discriminate on its face against railroads in
reorganization proceedings in states outside the defined region
during the effective period of the Rail Act. In fact, the Court's
decision in SR Act Cases was based on a finding that the Rail
Act was geographically uniform.56 The Court was able to reach
this decision because it had the benefit of hindsight in gauging
whether the Rail Act satisfied the uniformity requirement:
when the issue reached the Court, the 180 day effective period
of the Rail Act had already passed. Because no railroads outside the defined region of the Rail Act were in reorganization
proceedings during the 180 day effective period, the Court was
able to conclude that the Rail Act in fact applied uniformly during that period.
Thus, not only would the United States' reliance on 3R Act
Cases as a discrimination case seem misplaced, but any
reliance on the narrow exception to the uniformity test that SR
Act Cases carved out of the traditional uniformity test would
seem misplaced. Because the Act in Ptasynski is not limited, as
was the Rail Act, to a 180 day effective period,57 when the
Court reviews Ptasynski it will not have the benefit of hindsight to gauge whether the exemption in fact operates
uniformly. And since oil is currently being produced in the exempt Alaska regions, and producers in these areas are not being taxed,5 8 while producers of the same type of oil in other
states are being taxed at 30%, any reliance on the SR Act Cases
narrow exception by the Court in Ptasynski would be wholly
misplaced.
Consequently, it may be that the Rail Act in SR Act Cases
discriminated against railroads, outside its defined region, that
55.
56.
57.
58.

Brief for Defendant, supra note 8, at 8.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
I.R.C. S 4990 (Supp. V 1981).
See supra note 52.
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did not happen to be in reorganization proceedings during the
effective period of the Rail Act. Nonetheless, the Rail Act still
created uniform bankruptcy laws. Analogously, it may be, as
the District Court found, that the Alaska exemption
discriminates against oil producers in other states, because on
its face the Act prefers oil producers in Alaska over oil producers in other states. But as the Court's analysis in 3R Act
Cases suggests, a finding of facial discrimination does not
necessarily preclude a finding of geographic uniformity. Thus,
even though the Act facially exempts certain regions of one
state, Alaska, and, as applied, relieves some producers of newly discovered oil from paying taxes, the court should not be
relieved from addressing the proper issue under the uniformity
clause.
C. Uniformity Versus NationalInterest/RationalJustification
The United States' last argument, which the District Court
disposed of almost summarily, asserted that a rational
justification for the existence of the Alaska exemption could
validate its existence, notwithstanding the fact that the exemption might otherwise violate the uniformity clause.5 9 This
argument was apparently based on a concurrence filed by
Justice Marshall, and joined by Justice Brennan, in Railway
Labor. There, Justice Marshall suggested that the requirement
of geographic uniformity not be applied if the application of the
non-geographically uniform law served a national interest and
the identified national interest justified Congress' failure to
apply the law uniformly. 60
In effect, this argument is a repudiation of the whole concept of geographic uniformity as historically interpreted by the
Court. Although Congress is not prohibited from taking into
account geographically isolated problems, as long as the
statute operates with the same force and effect wherever the
subject is found, Justice Marshall's reasoning would in effect
give Congress a free hand to circumvent uniformity requirements whenever it could demonstrate the law was in the
national interest and was rationally justified. Although Justice
Marshall did not find that RITA in Railway Labor satisfied his
59. 550 F. Supp. at 553.
60. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4263.
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national interest requirement, because RITA was narrowly
tailored to provide relief for only one railroad, the Rock Island,
it is difficult to believe he would have the same problem with
the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act. The Congressional
debates make it clear that, in providing an exemption to certain areas of Alaska, Congress hoped to create an incentive for
oil producers to develop oil resources in areas where producers
might otherwise not go because of the severe difficulties involved in production. 61 Thus, Justice Marshall might
reasonably conclude that it was in the national interest for
Congress to provide an exemption for Alaska, in order thereby
to increase domestic production and to reduce the country's
reliance on foreign oil. Justice Marshall might then justify the
Alaska exemption by concluding that only in Alaska do such
severe conditions exist.
In order to address Justice Marshall's novel interpretation
of the uniformity requirement, it is necessary to review the
underlying purpose of the uniformity clause. In Justice Story's
terms, the purpose of the uniformity clause "was to cut off all
undue preferences of one state over another, in the regulation
of subjects affecting their common interests. ' 62 It is difficult
to imagine, as of the time the Act was passed, a subject more
vital, affecting the common interests of citizens of more states,
than oil.63 But Justice Story's statement of the purpose of the

uniformity requirement, which neither Plaintiffs nor the
government disputes,6 4 prohibits Congress from preferring
any state over any other state, notwithstanding the national
interest. Thus, even if it were in the national interest to prefer
Alaskan producers over producers in other states, the uniformity clause prohibits Congress from doing so.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court might reasonably conclude that the
Wyoming District Court reached the right result on the uniformity issue, but for many of the wrong reasons. By disregard61. See supra text accompanying note 8.
62. See supra text accompanying note 17.
63. See, e.g., President Carter's Energy Address to the Nation, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 609, 611 (Apr. 5, 1979), stating that the country's "national strength is dangerously
dependent on a thin line of oil tankers, stretching half-way around the Earth ....
64. See generally Brief for Defendant, supra note 6; Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 6.
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ing the recent case law interpreting the uniformity requirement in the bankruptcy setting, the Wyoming Court was able
to apply the traditional uniformity test which, if interpreted
literally, as the court's opinion shows, allows for few exceptions. Moreover, while the court purported to apply the traditional test, it in fact engaged in a perfunctory analysis which
essentially went no further than the literal language of the Act
itself. And the fact that the court spoke in terms of discrimination, while purporting to engage in a geographic analysis,
reveals its overall misperception of the uniformity issue.
Nonetheless, it would seem the court reached the right
result. The Alaskan exemption, contrary to the United States'
argument, allows newly discovered oil to go untaxed, while
newly discovered oil in other states is taxed at 30%. Thus, the
Alaskan exemption provides a geographically-based exception
to the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act and thereby does not
tax oil in Alaska with the same force and effect oil is taxed
elsewhere in the United States.
PETER R. MOUNSEY
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